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BEYOND THE HIGH 
MODERNIST MOMENT
– AN INTERVIEW WITH JAMES C. SCOTT
  N I E L S BR I M N E S & C A S PE R A N DE R S E N
Anyone reading ‘Seeing Like a State’ will notice that you are critical of states. 
Having been here in Denmark for an extended period of time how do you come to 
terms with the fact that it seems we have a state here which is quite omnipresent, 
well liked and generally trusted?
It is obviously true that the Danes and the Scandinavians love their states, be-
cause they seem to have domesticated them relatively successfully, and they are 
probably the best functioning welfare states in the world. I was reading a Francis 
Fukuyama book and there was a little section in it called ‘Getting to Denmark’ as 
the aspiration of many countries.1 It is not as if I have not noticed how successful 
the Danish welfare state is, but the important thing is, and I do not have to remind 
you as historians of course, how recent a thing this is historically. I am, of course, 
writing mostly about third world states or socialist block states and it seems to 
me that the era of welfare socialism that is successful is not only con ined to a 
small part of the world but is radically recent in terms of being effective in the 
last three or four decades. One is always apt to forget that your successful state is 
created by struggle. 
The other thing that I would emphasize is that we all in the developed West 
have to understand the foundations of our relative prosperity in the world. Some-
one once asked George Orwell why the English working class had not made a rev-
olution and he said something like: “Oh, that’s simple, our proletariat is in India.” 
And the fact is that the proletariat of the West is toiling in factories in China, Mo-
zambique and Bangladesh. So it seems to me that with the international division 
of labor and with the circulation of capital that at the push of a button can go from 
one place to another, one has to realize that the ugly things which are the founda-
tion of our prosperity take place by and large out of our sight.
You say that the successful or benevolent welfare state is a very recent thing and 
that is of course true, but the states and processes that you criticize in your book 
1 Fukuyama: The Origins of Political Order, 14-19.
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are within the same time frame. So when you write about state driven disasters in 
the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, it is exactly when the building of the Danish 
welfare state begins.
In a sense you could say that the people behind the Russian revolution, Lenin in 
particular, actually did believe that politics would disappear as a struggle over 
values because there would be a technical solution to almost any social problem. 
You can see this if you read State and Revolution.2 Lenin drew this understand-
ing from German wartime experience in the First World War of central planning, 
when Germany held out much longer than expected. So it seems to me that you 
had the same basic aspirations in the Russian system as in Scandinavia, but in 
Russia you had a kind of autocracy that were able to remove any obstacle, protest, 
and social mobilization from below that would resist the lat application of these 
plans. So when I say that the Danes have domesticated their Leviathan, it seems to 
me that credit should go to the kind of social mobilization and democratic forces 
that prevents states from doing as they please.
In a little book called Two Cheers for Anarchism I make it clear that I think it is 
a hopeless and wrong utopian project to eliminate the state. The question is: can 
we domesticate the state and not let it escape our democratic power? I am quite 
pessimistic about that. We consider things like the French Revolution and the idea 
that all Frenchmen were subject to exactly the same law as opposed to the medi-
eval feudalist state of guilds, clergy, peasants, and so on to be emancipatory. We 
all celebrate the achievement of citizenship and the emancipation of the French 
Revolution. At the same time it is also clear that it eliminated a whole series of in-
termediate structures between the state and the citizen, and created the basis 
for a kind of direct mass-mobilization and total warfare which very soon Napo-
leon made use of in his invasion of Russia. The point I want to make is the ambiva-
lence of these emancipatory projects: they have a side that we celebrate and a side 
that gives us pause, because it created possibilities for the kinds of warfare and 
mobilization, which we saw in operation in much of the nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century. This is a question of the trade-off between security and 
freedom, and I think that the state is almost always going to choose security over 
freedom. It seems to me that we face a constant struggle as citizens to prevent the 
encroachment on our liberties by a state that may have the best intentions in the 
world of protecting us. 
If you were to write a new version of ‘Seeking Like a State’, could you imagine in-
cluding a case where the state has a positive role to play in the planning process in 
order to paint a more diverse picture of how states can see and what states can do? 
2 Lenin: Staten og Revolutionen.
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Vaccination is interesting, because when people are looking for ‘the good state’, 
vaccination comes up again and again. I understand that vaccination only works, 
if you vaccinate a certain proportion of the vulnerable population and that you 
have to vaccinate people quickly to break the cycle of infection. And assuming the 
vaccination is right, that it is called for by the scienti ic facts, I would be happy to 
use an army to enforce people to be vaccinated because it would save so many 
lives. 
I of course have a history of working on peasants and the Third World and I 
think it is fair to say that in most Third World countries the elites has been too 
far separated from their peasant population. Nyerere3 is a good example. He was 
a completely honest uncorrupt, upright school teacher. Yet he was deeply embar-
rassed by his own population’s backwardness and wanted to drag them into the 
twentieth century. If it took force, he was willing to use it. From his point of view 
these people’s opinion did not count because they were so backward. He did not 
understand or respect why the people were moving from place to place and why 
they were organized as they were, because he never inspected or enquired as to 
the rationality of their subsistence practices, planting practices, nomadic pasto-
ralism and so on. As a result he made a complete mess of their lives. 
Do I think that the state has become more bene icent in the last forty years? 
With the exception of the fact that it is more than half a century since our last 
great war, with the exception of warfare – and you could argue that this is an ef-
fect of atomic power because it is so catastrophic – I do not think the state has be-
come more bene icent, no. But I am happy to admit for local exceptions, Denmark 
would be one of them.
It seems dif icult, however, to distinguish between vaccination, where you can use 
force because it serves a good purpose, and agricultural reform, where you should 
not use force?
I have actually thought of this in relation to agricultural reform. What we call 
Agricultural Extension Services are specialists who try to improve agricultur-
al practices. If I were the Tanzanian minister in charge of agricultural improve-
ment, I would do two things. First of all I would not send extension agents with a 
plan to encourage or even force people to adopt new practices. No, the irst thing 
I would do is that I would send the extension agents to the rural communities to 
ask the question: “What problems do you need solved? Let us try to work on your 
agenda of how we might improve your life. Tell us the problems you would like to 
3 Julius Nyerere (1922-99). Den første leder af det ua hængige Tanzania (fra 1961-64 Tangya-
nika). Nyerere var inspireret af socialismen og styrede Tanzania som en et-partistat. Blandt 
hans politiske initiativer var genbosætningen af landbefolkningen i planlagte Ujamaa-
landsbyer. Nyerere trak sig tilbage i 1985.
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have solved and we will then put our scienti ic apparatus and brains together in 
order to solve your problems.” This is rather like my favorite example of an anar-
chist movement, Solidarity in Poland, in which the intellectuals like Adam Mich-
nik came to the Solidarity strikers and said: “How can we help you? What do you 
need to know about the constitution? What do you need to know about the legal 
system? You tell us what we can do for you.” So the irst thing I would do is to have 
the agenda of agricultural improvement come from the grassroots, from a real 
contact with the villagers. 
The second thing I would do, which is done already to a certain extent, is to 
have demonstration farms. That is to say not force people to do anything, but to 
show them the results of certain planning practices, certain seeds, certain culti-
vation techniques, and do this in their village or nearby and then leave it to them 
whether they want to adopt these practices. There is a kind of theory about this 
developed by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler in a book called Nudge4 – meaning 
an effort to create incentives that move people towards better practices. 
In the Malay village in which I was doing research, I lived with a quite crusty, 
sixty-year-old man who in many respects was a reactionary, but he was a very 
good rice farmer. Near the state capital about forty miles away there were a series 
of experimental plots. I had a little car so we went there. He made us stop again 
and again because he noticed some rice that looked particular good to him. We 
must have stopped ive or six times, and each time he went over a fence at age six-
ty to cut little particles of seeds of this rice, which he liked. Then he planted them 
to see how they turned out. Later on I happened to ask someone in the state’s Ag-
ricultural Ministry about this and he said: “We were trying out all these different 
types of rice and we planned to introduce them in two or three years time, but by 
the time we got around to introducing them, it turned out that everybody knew 
about them because they were passing the seeds back and forth.” 
So it seems to me that the role of the state in the case of agricultural improve-
ment is to start with an agenda of what people would like, what their idea of an 
improvement of life would be, and then to give them a series of options that they 
are free to take up and free not to take up as they wish. There is a sense in which 
things that are compulsory are resisted just because they are compulsory. I really 
do believe in the role of the state as a demonstrator of a whole series of options, 
without assuming that it knows the way a good life ought to be lived. 
One more example of a terrible idea. In Holland after the Second World War 
they built a tremendous amount of urban housing for people coming in from the 
countryside. They knew that these people lived in the kitchen and they thought 
this was uncivilized. So when they built these lats for the workers, they made the 
kitchen so small that you could not put a table in it or sit down in it, in order to 
4 Sunstein & Thaler: Nudge – Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness.
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force people into the sitting-room, which they thought was a proper middle-class 
way to live. So by an architectural design they were taking away a cultural prac-
tice and obliterating it because it was seen as uncivilized and backward. That is 
the kind of stupid urban planning that I ind objectionable.
The muscular, authoritarian, high modernist state is not very common in history, 
but you ind a lot of states with high modernist aspirations and a high modernist 
rhetoric.  Does it change your analytical framework that most of the iascos we see 
in the world over the last hundred years or so, are made by states that are not as 
powerful as they wish they were? For example many of the de-colonized states in the 
1950s and 1960s have all the high-modernist rhetoric, but much less muscle power?
I think that is a valid criticism of my book. In that regard two things are true. First 
of all there is this moment of the high tide of high modernism, and this moment 
does not exist anymore. That is to say that today none of us has this blind faith 
in science, technology, and experts. We have seen how this can go wrong and we 
have seen the current state of life on the planet, of extinction of species, and so on. 
It seems to me that we now live in a moment in which the illusions of high mod-
ernist, technical solutions as the answer to human problems are not only gone, 
but that now there is a kind of resistance and skepticism even to good science. I 
think the moment the book describes has passed. You could argue – although I do 
not – that the skepticism has become too great and prevents things that might be 
good from happening.
If the high modernist moment is over, then ‘Seeing Like a State’ is about a speci ic 
period. How would you demarcate this period, the 1880s to the 1960s?
Something like that. I think it depends slightly on geography. The Third World’s 
high modernist romance is later because it comes with independence. You could 
argue that the European romance of high modernism ends earlier than the Amer-
ican romance. The First World War, in which people have seen what industrial-
ized slaughter can do, marks the end of high modernism in Europe. The poets, the 
novels, and so on all changed radically as a result of the war. Because the Ameri-
cans were much less personally touched by the First World War, because of their 
booming economy and their victory of the Second World War, I think that the 
American romance with high modernism went on into perhaps the Earth Day and 
the environmentalist movement. I do not think it is possible to talk about high 
modernism without some speci icity about geography and cultures and so on.
Do you think that environmentalism and concern for the environment has been one 
of the main reasons for undermining the romance with high modernism?
18
I do not think I have thought carefully about this, but do you not think, we some-
how realize collectively that we have ‘pissed in the soup’? In the year 1750 there 
were three quarters of a billion of us, and now we are going on eight billion. We 
are the most dangerous, invasive species that the world has ever seen, and I be-
lieve it is completely obvious to all of us that sustaining the contemporary life-
style of wealthy Europeans for the whole world is ecologically unsustainable giv-
en the sort of resources we have. I am very much taken with Elizabeth Kolbert’s 
book The Sixth Extinction5 about the way in which we determine the life condi-
tions and survival of every other species on earth. We are like zoo-keepers that 
do not quite know what they are doing. It is too strong to call this an apocalyp-
tic vision, but I think that almost everyone who is conscious, is looking over their 
shoulder and asking ‘what are we heading towards?’. Somehow the aggregate ef-
fects of our activities in mining and transportation, our combustion engines and 
fossil fuels have ended up jeopardizing our future and the future of all the other 
species with which we share the planet. For some people I suppose the realization 
of this comes with the irst Earth Day in 1970.
In ‘Seeing Like a State’ high modernism appears as a European project. Your irst 
case is from Prussia in the eighteenth century, high modernism is then traced 
across Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and when inally we 
go to Tanzania in the 1960s, they are described as ‘consuming’ Western modernity. 
Much historical scholarship in the last twenty years has attempted to show that you 
ind similar modernizing, state-building projects in the Ottoman Empire or in eigh-
teenth-century China. Do you think that high modernism as it develops in the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century is a speci ically European project, 
something that came from Europe and then moved outwards?
My assumption was exactly that it was a European ‘export’ if you like, which some 
countries like the U.S. adopted and then propagated themselves. I would be pre-
pared to be shown differently: that the Ottoman Empire or Qing China had simi-
lar projects of simpli ication, similar ways of looking at their population. At that 
level the state simpli ication project goes back much, much further. It goes back 
to the Roman castra, which was exactly the same everywhere it was put down; 
to the Spanish town plan with the plaza and the cathedral and the market, which 
was applied all over Latin America; to things like cadastral surveys and popula-
tion lists. This is what I think of as the quartermaster’s eye, which always wants 
to regularize and create a legible population.
The Japanese case of imitating European models is well chronicled, how they 
sent delegations to Germany, to the US, and so on trying to igure out how to struc-
5 Kolbert: The Sixth Extinction: an unnatural history.
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ture their institutions so that they would become a modern, progressive, dynamic 
country. It seems to me that these imitative efforts occurred because Germany, 
France, US, and so on have gotten a reputation of being the most advanced, scien-
ti ic countries. The imitating countries thought that if they got the ‘magic formu-
las’ right then everything else would follow: if they got the constitution right, the 
institutions would follow. It seems to me that it was the scienti ic and economic 
charisma of industrialization in the West that drove this imitation. Therefore, I 
am assuming that this process went only in one direction. I am sure that when 
these things reached Japan and the Ottoman Empire they were changed by local 
conditions, local cultural assumptions, and so on, so they did not look like they 
would in Germany, but that is what I would think of as a vernacularization of a 
kind of ‘universal’.
But a ‘universal’ grown in the West?
Again, I would be happy to be shown differently. But I think of the “’heartland’” 
of industrialization from 1810 to 1930 as being essentially the West. And if you 
ask yourself why Nyerere was embarrassed by ‘his own’ peasants, I think it was 
because he had a western, missionary education and he thought that it was un-
civilized not having a permanent place to live, and that it was only if the peas-
ants were settled down that he could deliver health care, clean water, and schools. 
But he basically thought that the peasants’ way of living was not civilized, and he 
knew this from his comparisons to the West. If you think of Atatürk’s reforms in 
Turkey and Reza Shah’s in Iran these were radical modernization projects that 
tried to change everything about what people wore, their names, and so on. Of 
course there was a backlash eventually in each of these places though it took a 
long time to develop.
Perhaps we could end on a more theoretical turf. There seems to be a signi icant in-
spiration from Michel Foucault in the way you write about the state’s need to ‘see’ 
people in a certain regular way. At the same time your critics are also referring to 
Foucault and his notion of governmentality; to the state as being much more het-
erogeneous than you depict it. Can you say anything more about how you see your 
work in relation to Foucault’s work?
Foucault has been extremely in luential to me, especially Discipline and Punish.6 
Moving from demonstrative, public humiliations and punishment to the peniten-
tiary and the effort to create a kind of scienti ic council regime is a brilliant take. 
I am in debt to Foucault. However, one of the things that he promised to do was a 
6 Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
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‘micropolitics of resistance’-analysis. He keeps saying that his analysis can be ap-
plied to resistance practices and so on, but he never gets around to it, partly be-
cause he is so good at describing the governmentality effects. I think of my work, 
including work before and after Seeing Like a State such as Domination and the 
Arts of Resistance and The Art of Not Being Governed, as in a sense describing prac-
tices that I believe Foucault would have had something more intelligent than I to 
say about, but never got around to writing about.
James C. Scott was interviewed by Niels Brimnes and Casper Andersen in Aarhus 
18 May 2015. Thanks to student assistant, Astrid Ølgaard Christensen for tran-
scribing the sound ile.
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